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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
STATUTES OF REPOSE: JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE
VERSUS LEGISLATIVE WILL
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, Hardy v. Ver-
Meulen i and Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. ,2 found Ohio's medical mal-
practice statute of repose violative of the Ohio Constitution. 3 Currently,
state courts are divided on the constitutionality of medical malpractice
statutes of repose. 4 However, the two Ohio cases highlight an emerging
1. 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029
(1988). For a thorough discussion of Hardy, see infra notes 116-17 & 124-31 and
accompanying text.
2. 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987). For a thorough discussion of
Gaines, see infra notes 118-23 & 132-39 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the provisions of the Ohio Constitution violated by
Ohio's medical malpractice statute of repose, see infra notes 110-14 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the definition of statute of repose, see infra
notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
4. Courts finding medical malpractice statutes of repose constitutional in-
clude: Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (North Carolina
law); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1983) (Iowa law); Jewson v. Mayo
Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) (Minnesota law); Bowlin Horn v. Citizens
Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1982); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d
543 (1976); Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77 (Del. 1979); Carr v. Broward
County, 505 So. 2d 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho
179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560
(1979); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980);
Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1986); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic
Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305
(La. 1986); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985); Ross v. Kansas
City Gen. Hosp. & Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980); Colton v.
Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181,
646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36
(1987); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978); Allen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981).
Courts finding the statutes unconstitutional include: Kenyon v. Hammer,
142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (violated state equal protection clause); Aus-
tin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984) (violated state equal protection guaran-
tees); Phelan v. Hanft, 471 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (violated state
constitutional right of access to courts), vacated, 488 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1986)
(supreme court, in denying appeal, vacated lower court's alternative ruling that
statute of repose was unconstitutional); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316
S.E.2d 155 (1984) (violated equal protection clause); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga.
470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983) (violated equal protection clause in wrongful death
action); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (violated minor's
state constitutional right of access to courts); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,
424 A.2d 825 (1980) (violated state equal protection guarantees); Gaines v.
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (violated state equal
(397)
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trend of decisions finding such statutes unconstitutional. 5 These two
protection, due process and right-to-a-remedy provisions); Hardy v. VerMeulen,
32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.W.2d 626 (violated right-to-a-remedy provision of
state constitution), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988); Mominee v. Scherbarth,
28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 503 N.E.2d 717 (1986) (violated minors' state due process
rights); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988) (special statute limiting
scope of recoverable damages constituted special legislation); Neagle v. Nelson,
685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. 1985) (violated state open courts provision); Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (violated open courts provision of state
constitution); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (violated minors' due
process guarantees set forth in open courts provision of state constitution);
Khonke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 410 N.W.2d 585 (Ct.
App. 1987) (violated right-to-remedy provision of state constitution), review
granted, 141 Wis. 2d 983, 416 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1987), aff'd on other grounds and
remanded, 144 Wis. 2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (Wis. 1988).
5. The chart below depicts the number of leading state court decisions ini-
tially passing on the constitutionality of a medical malpractice statute of repose
in response to an equal protection, due process or open courts challenge, and
the outcomes of the decisions in given years.
'76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88
Constitutional
1 0 1b 2c 2 d 3 3F Ig 1 h Ii  2i 1k 0
Unconstitutional
0 0 0 0 1, 0 0 1' 3 n 0 1' 2P q
a. Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976) (did not violate
state or federal due process).
b. Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978) (did not violate
state or federal equal protection or state open courts provision).
c. Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77 (Del. 1979) (did not violate state
open courts provision); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560
(1979) (did not violate state due process or equal protection).
d. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 402-05, 404 N.E.2d 585,
603-04 (1980) (did not violate due process or equal protection); Ross v. Kansas
City Gen. Hosp. & Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980) (did not violate
due process, equal protection or right to privacy).
e. Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981)
(did not violate state or federal equal protection); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M.
181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981) (did not violate due process or equal protec-
tion), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016
(1982); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981) (did not
violate state equal protection).
f. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1981) (Minnesota statute
did not violate federal due process or equal protection); Bowling Horn v. Citi-
zens Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1982) (statute did not create arbitrary classifi-
cation); Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.E.2d 913 (1982) (did not violate
state due process or open courts provisions or federal equal protection).
g. Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 657 P.2d 476 (1983) (did not violate
federal equal protection).
h. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (North Carolina
statute did not violate state or federal equal protection or state open courts
provision).
i. Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985) (did not violate state
access to courts provision).
j. Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1986) (did not violate state
or federal equal protection); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986)
(nonviolative of state or federal equal protection or due process or state open
courts provision).
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cases, other recent decisions6 and language in several recent related
cases 7 indicates that the number of courts finding medical malpractice
statutes of repose unconstitutional will increase. These recent decisions
indicate judicial dissatisfaction with the harsh results that medical mal-
practice statutes of repose can create and with the enactment of the stat-
utes in response to what is now termed the "perceived" medical
malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's. 8 The reasoning of these re-
cent decisions is consistent with the logic and fairness of applying the
discovery rule to medical malpractice actions9 and with the principal
purpose of tort law, compensating injured victims.10 Consequently, an
increasing number ofjurisdictions should follow the reasoning of recent
decisions and find medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitu-
tional in the future.
This Note will first discuss the development of medical malpractice
statutes of repose and their relation to the emergence of the discovery
rule in medical malpractice actions and to the medical malpractice insur-
k. Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987) (did not violate state
or federal equal protection).
1. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (violative of state
equal protection).
m. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (violative of minors' due
process guarantees set forth in open courts provision of state constitution).
n. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984) (violative of
state equal protection clause); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984) (viola-
tive of state equal protection guarantees); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316
S.E.2d 155 (1984) (violative of equal protection).
o. Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (statute invali-
dated with respect to minors only).
p. Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987) (vio-
lated right-to-remedy provision), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988); Gaines v.
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987) (violated
equal protection, due process and right-to-a-remedy provisions).
q. Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988) (statute limiting recovery
to medical expenses after running of statutory period violative of special legisla-
tion provision).
6. For a discussion of other recent state court decisions holding medical
malpractice statutes of repose unconstitutional, see infra notes 95-109 and ac-
companying text.
7. Language in several recent related cases indicates that some courts which
have already decided that these statutes are constitutional may be willing to re-
consider their positions. For a discussion of these cases, see infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of judicial dissatisfaction with medical malpractice stat-
utes of repose, see infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of why the recent decisions are consistent with the appli-
cation of the discovery rule, see infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
10. The law of torts "is directed toward the compensation of individuals,
rather than the public, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of
their legally recognized interests generally, rather than one interest only, where
the law considers that compensation is required." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 1, at 5-6 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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ance crisis of the 1970's. 1 This Note will next examine the challenges
made to medical malpractice statutes of repose under various federal
and state constitutional provisions, 12 the reasoning of earlier decisions
upholding these statutes as constitutional' 3 and the reasoning of later
decisions finding these statutes unconstitutional. 14 Finally, this Note
will analyze the similarity between the history of medical malpractice
statutes of repose and automobile guest statutes, which appears to indi-
cate that an increasing number of courts will find medical malpractice
statutes of repose unconstitutional in the future. 15
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose
1. Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are often confused.16
They are similar in that they both prescribe the time period within which
a plaintiff may commence his Suit. 17 The distinguishing feature between
the two is the time at which the respective periods commence. Gener-
ally, in medical malpractice actions, if the plaintiff's cause of action ac-
crues and the statutory period commences when the injury occurs or, as
is most often the case, when the plaintiff is or should be aware that he
11. For a discussion of the development of medical malpractice statutes of
repose, see infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
While this Note restricts its discussion to medical malpractice statutes of
repose, similar statutes have been enacted in other areas such as construction
and products liability. For a discussion of statutes of repose generally, see Mc-
Govern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose,
30 AM. U.L. REV. 579 (1981); Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Feder-
alism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627 (1985). While some articles address statutes
of repose generally, this Note submits that the development of medical malprac-
tice statutes of repose may not necessarily parallel the development of statutes
of repose in other areas. Compare Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231
N.E.2d 588 (1967) (construction statute of repose unconstitutional) with Ander-
son v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (medical malpractice stat-
ute of repose constitutional).
12. For a discussion of constitutional challenges to medical malpractice
statutes of repose, see infra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of early state cases upholding the constitutionality of
medical malpractice statutes of repose, see infra notes 67-85 and accompanying
text.
14. For a discussion of later state cases finding medical malpractice statutes
of repose unconstitutional, see infra notes 94-139 and accompanying text.
15. For a comparison of the evolution of medical malpractice statutes of
repose with the evolution of automobile guest statutes, see infra notes 140-59
and accompanying text.
16. Note, supra note 11, at 628-29. ("The term 'statute of repose' can cre-
ate analytical difficulties because it lacks a precise definition and is often con-
fused with 'statute of limitations.' ").
17. Id. For a general discussion of the various definitions of statutes of re-
pose, see McGovern, supra note 11, at 582-87.
400
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has been injured, the statute is properly termed a statute of limita-
tions. 18 If the statutory period commences upon the occurrence of an
event, regardless of when the injury occurs, at a time when the plaintiff
may or may not be aware of any injury, the statute is properly termed a
statute of repose. 19 In the latter case the repose period commences
upon the occurrence of an event, such as the negligent act or omission
of the health care practitioner, but the injury caused by this act or omis-
sion may be latent and therefore not manifest itself until after the statu-
tory period has elapsed. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim may be
barred before he is or should be aware that he has been injured or has a
claim.2 0 This result may also occur under certain statutes of limitations
if the limitations period commences on the date of the injury regardless
18. Limitations periods are generally thought to commence when an action
accrues. See 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13.07, at
13-20 to -21 (1988) (majority of jurisdictions construe "time of accrual of ac-
tion" under medical malpractice statutes of limitations as date patient discovers
injury, rather than utilizing time-of-negligent-act as date of accrual); see also
Note, supra note 11, at 629 (statutes of limitations triggered at time cause of
action accrues).
Some repose periods also commence when an action "accrues." For exam-
ple, the Arkansas medical malpractice statute of repose provided: "Hereafter all
actions ... against physicians ... shall be commenced within two [2] years after
the cause of action accrues. The date of the accrual of the cause of action shall
be the date of the wrongful act complained of, and no other time." Owen v.
Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 23-24, 537 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1976) (quoting ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 37-205 (1962)).
Adoption of the discovery rule changed the judicial interpretation of when a
cause of action "accrued" under a medical malpractice statute of limitations
from the date of the negligent act or omission of the health care practitioner to
the date on which the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his injury.
1 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra 13.07, at 13-20. For a discussion of the
discovery rule, see infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
19. Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 820 (Okla. 1988).
20. For example, in Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. 1968),
a surgeon negligently left a surgical instrument in a plaintiff's back during an
operation performed in 1951. The plaintiff did not discover that the instrument
had been left inside her until 1962, 11 years later. Id. at 311. The applicable
statute of limitations provided that all medical malpractice actions must be com-
menced within two years of the occurrence of the negligent act. Id. at 310. Con-
sequently, the plaintiff's cause of action against the physician accrued in 1951
and was barred in 1953, two years from the date of the back surgery. Therefore,
the plaintiff's claim was barred more than nine years before she was aware that
she had been injured. Many statutes contain limitations and repose provisions.
For example, Illinois' medical malpractice statute of repose provided:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician or
hospital ... shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which
the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have known .... of the injury ... but in no event shall such action be
brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or
omission or occurrence alleged ... to have been the cause of such in-
jury or death.
Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 299, 402 N.E.2d 560, 561 (1979) (quoting
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, 22.1 (1977)). In this statute the two-year period is the
limitations period while the four-year period is the repose period.
1989] NOTE
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of whether the plaintiff has discovered it.21 However, if the limitations
period commences upon the discovery of an injury, the plaintiff is aware
that he has been injured, and that he therefore has a claim, before the
statutory period begins to elapse. Consequently, he has the statutorily
prescribed period to organize his affairs and commence his suit. For the
purposes of this Note, the term statute of repose includes any statute
that can bar a plaintiff's claim before he is or should be aware that one
exists.
Prior to the 1960's and 1970's, most medical malpractice statutes of
limitations were essentially statutes of repose. In the majority of states
during this period, a claimant's cause of action accrued on the date on
which the negligent act of the health care practitioner occurred. 2 2 Con-
sequently, if an injury caused by a health care practitioner's negligence
did not manifest itself within the statutorily prescribed period, the in-
21. Some courts have noted the distinction between statutes of repose and
statutes of limitations without the benefit of the discovery rule that commence
on the date the injury occurs. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 73, 688
P.2d 961, 965 (1984); Reynolds, 760 P.2d at 819-21. The date of the injury and
therefore the time the statutory period commences, may be considered to be the
time when all the elements of a cause of action are complete. See McGovern,
supra note 11, at 584-86. In the majority of medical malpractice cases, the injury
occurs contemporaneously with the negligent act. Reynolds, 760 P.2d at 820-21.
In such cases, there may be no real distinction between statutes of repose and
statutes of limitations. However, in some cases injury may occur after the negli-
gent act. Thus, a statutory period commencing on the date of the injury may
begin to elapse later than that of a statute of repose. See McGovern, supra note
11, at 585-86. Of course, statutes of limitations without the benefit of the dis-
covery rule that commence on the date of injury may also begin to run before
the plaintiff is aware of his injury, and therefore, like a statute of repose, bar a
plaintiff's claim before he is aware that he has been injured. Id. For example, in
Kenyon the plaintiff came under a physician's care for her pregnancy. Kenyon, 142
Ariz. at 71, 688 P.2d at 963. During a prenatal examination the physician's
nurse negligently annotated the plaintiff's chart to indicate that the plaintiff had
Rh positive instead of Rh negative blood. Id. Since the plaintiff had Rh negative
blood she required a dosage of RhoGam within 72 hours of giving birth, other-
wise her ability to bear additional children would be substantially impaired. Id.
Because of the nurse's error, the physician failed to administer the RhoGam
when the plaintiff gave birth. Id. As a result, the plaintiff's second pregnancy,
five years later, resulted in a stillborn child. Id. The court held that the injury to
the plaintiff occurred when the doctor failed to administer the RhoGam since
that was when her physical condition changed for the worse. Id. at 75, 688 P.2d
at 967. Consequently, she did not discover her injury until nearly five years later
when her second child was stillborn and after the two-year statutory period had
elapsed. Id. Therefore, under Arizona's statute of limitations, as is often the
case with statutes of repose, the plaintiff's claim was barred before she was or
should have been aware that she had been injured. Id. at 76, 688 P.2d at 968.
Although statutes of repose and statutes of limitations without the benefit of
the discovery rule are distinguishable, their effect on a plaintiff's potential claim
appears to be quite similar. Consequently, for the purposes of this Note both
types of statutes will be included under the term statute of repose.
22. See D. LouiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, 13.07, at 13-20 to -21
(greatest change in law of malpractice in past 20 years is overwhelming accept-
ance of discovery rule by most states in place of time-of-negligent-act rule).
[Vol. 34: p. 397
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jured party was barred from bringing his claim before he was ever aware
that he had been injured.
2. The Discovery Rule
In response to the manifest unfairness that early medical malprac-
tice statutes of limitations produced, during the 1960's and 1970's many
state legislatures and some state judiciaries adopted the discovery
rule. 23 This rule provided that a medical malpractice claimant's cause of
action did not accrue until he discovered, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury caused by the
health care practitioner's negligence. 24 However, many state legisla-
tures and judiciaries did not apply the discovery rule to all situations.
Many state legislatures, responding to a judicial adoption of the discov-
ery rule, enacted statutes of repose that permitted only a limited applica-
tion of the discovery rule.2 5 Although these legislatures sought to
promote fairness, they enacted statutes that still contained outer limit
repose provisions. 26 In addition, some of the statutes and even some of
the judicial opinions adopting the discovery rule restricted use of the
rule to certain cases such as those involving plaintiffs who discovered
foreign objects within their bodies. 2 7 Consequently, a meritorious claim
23. Id. State courts adopting the discovery rule during this time period in-
clude: Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 14 Ariz. App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971);
Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Gaddis v. Smith, 417
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
24. 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, 13.07, at 13-20 to -25.
Some statutes further provided that the cause of action did not accrue until the
plaintiff discovered not only the injury, but also that the injury was caused by the
health care practitioner's negligence. Id. at 13-21 to -25 & n.54.
Two underlying reasons have been suggested as to why state courts and
legislatures found the original "statutes of limitations" unfair and consequently
adopted the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions. First, "the statutory
period within which the action must be initiated is short-one year, or at most
two, being the common time limit." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 899
comment e (1977). Second, "the nature of the tort itself and the character of the
injury will frequently prevent knowledge of what is wrong, so that the plaintiff is
forced to rely upon what he is told by the physician or surgeon." Id.
25. The Idaho legislature, for example, enacted IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4)
(1971) in response to the judicial adoption of the discovery rule in misdiagnosis
cases. Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 181-82, 657 P.2d 476, 478-79 (1983).
This statute limited use of the discovery rule to cases involving foreign objects
left within patients' bodies. Id. at 182, 657 P.2d at 479.
26. See Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 128, 321 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1982)
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1972) (reissued 1985) (one year from date of discov-
ery of negligence but not more than 10 years from negligent act)). For an exam-
ple of a bifurcated statute with an outer limit repose provision, see supra note 20.
27. See Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 182, 657 P.2d 476, 478-79 & n.4
(1983) (IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (1971) (restricted application of discovery rule
to cases where patient discovered foreign object in his or her body); Billings v.
Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 497-98, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (1964) (judicial adop-
tion of discovery rule limited to cases in which foreign object was left inside
patient's body); Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 838, 475 P.2d 530, 532
1989] NOTE 403
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could still be barred in many situations if a claimant did not discover his
or her injury within the applicable repose period. Therefore, many of
the new statutes and decisions created medical malpractice statutes of
repose with a limited use of the discovery rule.
3. The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis of the 1970's
In the early and mid 1970's many state legislatures enacted medical
malpractice statutes of repose in response to what was termed the medi-
cal malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's. 28 Furthermore, many
states with existing medical malpractice statutes of repose enacted ones
containing shorter repose periods.2 9 The legislative purpose of these
statutes was to control the "long tail" effect 30 created by the adoption of
the discovery rule. 3 1
Insurance groups asserted that because of this "long tail" effect and
(1969) (discovery rule extended to misdiagnosis); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.
2d 295, 308-09, 402 N.E.2d 560, 566 (1979) (court, citing several statutes, noted
discovery rule is available in actions against nurses and other medical personnel,
but not against limited group of health care providers such as physicians, sur-
geons and hospitals).
28. Decisions which recognize that the medical malpractice statute of re-
pose in question was enacted in response to the "medical malpractice insurance
crisis of the 1970's" include: Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hosp., 403 So. 2d
158, 160-61 (Ala. 1981); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 72, 688 P.2d 961,
964 (1984); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 305, 402 N.E.2d 560, 564
(1979); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tenn. 1978). For a thor-
ough discussion of legislation passed in response to this crisis, see Redish, Legis-
lative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications,
55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977).
29. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Il. 2d 295, 306-07, 402 N.E.2d 560,
565 (1979) (10-year repose period provided for in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, 22.1
(1965) was reduced by amendment in 1975 to five years and further reduced by
amendment to four years in 1976); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan.
115, 119-20, 631 P.2d 222, 226-27 (1981) (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (Supp.
1974) was amended in 1976, reducing personal injury repose period from 10
years to four years for health care providers).
30. Since medical malpractice insurance has traditionally been sold on an
occurrence basis, health care providers are protected against claims that may
arise in the future from negligent acts that occur during the policy year. Redish,
supra note 28, at 765. Consequently, it was asserted that "[t]he rate determining
process is dependent upon knowing with some degree of certainty the total po-
tential losses for a policy year, and any extension of the statutory period makes
rate-setting that much more difficult." Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.
& WELFARE, PUB. No. 73-88, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22, 38-40 (1973)). Consequently, the
longer the relevant period during which a claim can arise, "the longer the period
of risk (or 'long tail') extends for the insurance company." Id.
31. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 87, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (1984)
(problem of "long tail" which may be created by discovery rule was not signifi-
cant enough to support legislative enactment abolishing such rule); Stephens v.
Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 130, 631 P.2d 222, 235 (1981) (principal
cause of increased cost and unavailability of medical malpractice insurance was
attributed by legislature to the "long tail" created by discovery rule).
[Vol. 34: p. 397
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for other reasons, 32 exorbitant medical malpractice liability insurance
premiums were required to cover current and possible future malprac-
tice claims against health care practitioners. 33 As a result, medical mal-
practice liability insurance premiums skyrocketed. 34 Insurance and
health care special interest groups then applied pressure upon state leg-
islatures to enact legislation abrogating or limiting the use of the discov-
ery rule, as well as imposing other limitations on medical malpractice
actions, to help reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums. 3 5 In
response to this lobbying pressure many states enacted medical mal-
practice acts which restricted various aspects of medical malpractice ac-
tions. 3 6 Many of these acts contained medical malpractice statutes of
repose. 3
7
32. Other reasons for the crisis include the increase in the frequency of
claims and rising jury awards. Redish, supra note 28, at 761.
33. Id. at 761, 765.
34. McKay, Rethinking the Tort Liability System: A Report From the ABA Commis-
sion, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1220 (1987) (as result of medical malpractice "crisis"
of mid 1970's, insurance companies raised malpractice insurance rates dramati-
cally). Between 1960 and 1970, insurance rates for surgeons rose 942.2% and
rates for nonsurgical physicians increased 540.8%. Redish, supra note 28, at
759-60 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. 73-88, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE 13 (1973)). In some states, premiums paid by physicians rose more than
100% between 1974 and mid-1975 alone. Id.
35. "[T]he perceptions of a panicked public as well as ferocious lobbying by
the medical profession and insurance industry generated intense pressure on
state legislatures to enact remedial [medical malpractice] legislation." Learner,
Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo"
Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 143, 144 (1981).
"As a result of the complaints of the powerful medical profession, many states
adopted legislation designed to reduce the recoveries and thus to influence a
downturn in rates." McKay, supra note 34, at 1220.
36. Five of the most common legislative proposals included:
(1) limiting either the amount of recovery by plaintiffs or the liability of
individual health care providers; (2) reducing the statute of limitations
applicable to medical malpractice actions; (3) abrogating the collateral
source rule in medical malpractice actions; (4) establishing medico-
legal screening panel plans; and (5) establishing either compulsory or
voluntary arbitration plans.
Redish, supra note 28, at 761; see also Turkington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort
Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative
Responses to the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1299, 1300-01
(1987) (citing similar proposals regarding medical malpractice legislation).
State legislatures enacting such legislation usually indicated that while they
sought to reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums for health care practi-
tioners, they did so to ensure adequate health care would be available to the
general public. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d
359, 371, 683 P.2d 670, 677-78, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 678-79 (1984) (as result of
"skyrocketing" medical malpractice insurance rates many doctors decided to
stop providing medical care with respect to high risk procedures, to terminate
their practice in the state altogether or to practice without medical malpractice
insurance).
37. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 935, 424 A.2d 825, 833 (1980)
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The validity and severity of this medical malpractice insurance crisis
of the 1970's as well as the effectiveness of the legislation enacted in
response to it38 has been disputed.3 9 One commentator suggests that
the crisis may have been caused by insurance companies receiving low
returns on investments while payments for medical malpractice claims
increased rapidly. 40 He suggests further that the crisis probably sub-
sided because insurance companies began receiving higher returns on
their investments due to the dramatic rise in interest rates during the
late 1970's and early 1980's and because doctors passed the increased
cost of medical malpractice liability insurance onto their patients. 4 '
Many courts, feeling that this crisis was in fact illusory or that this legis-
lation was inappropriate, have held that much of this legislation, includ-
ing many medical malpractice statutes of repose, is unconstitutional. 4 2
(New Hampshire act limiting various aspects of medical malpractice actions con-
tained medical malpractice statute of limitations with limited use of discovery
rule).
38. "Much of the legislation was ill-conceived, or at least did not perform as
intended." McKay, supra note 34, at 1220.
At least one authority suggests that medical malpractice statutes of repose
have a minimal effect on alleviating the "long tail" effect and reducing medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums. Indications are that "88% of all medi-
cal malpractice injuries which result in claims are reported within the first two
years following injury, that 95 to 96% of all claims have been reported within
three years, 97% within four years and only 2% are reported after five years."
Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 86, 688 P.2d 961, 978 (1984) (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. 73-88, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 254 (1973)).
39. Turkington, supra note 36, at 1299-1300 & n.3 (congressional reports
and other forums questioned the bona fide nature of the supposed "crisis").
40. See McKay, supra note 34, at 1220; see also Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28
Ohio St. 3d 270, 280-81, 503 N.E.2d 717, 725-26 (1986) (CelebreezeJ., concur-
ring) (medical malpractice insurance crisis may have been attributable, at least in
part, to insurance cycles). One commentator has suggested that the high inci-
dence of medical malpractice claims may be attributable to some physicians'
poor intake diagnostic practices and to the increased risks of error accompany-
ing the use of complex medical technology. Learner, supra note 35, at 146 &
n.15.
41. See McKay, supra note 34, at 1220. It should be noted that another lia-
bility insurance "crisis" allegedly occurred in the mid-1980's. See id. at 1221.
The cause of this crisis may also have been largely attributable to insurance com-
panies earning low returns on investments while charging artificially low premi-
ums. Id. at 1220-2 1; see also Mooney, The Liability Crisis-A Perspective, 32 VILL. L.
REV. 1235 (1987) (discusses causes and possible solutions to liability insurance
crisis of 1980's).
42. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 87, 688 P.2d 961, 979 ("long
tail" effect has minimal effect ca price and availability of health care); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) ("The evidence in the case before us
... indicates that either the Legislature was misinformed or subsequent events
have changed the situation substantially ... [because malpractice insurance] pre-
miums in North Dakota are the sixth lowest in the United States."). One court,
in refusing to uphold further reform legislation enacted subsequent to the per-
ceived crisis of the 1970's when it appeared no crisis existed, stated: "Absent a
crisis to justify the enactment of such legislation, we can ascertain no satisfactory
[Vol. 34: p. 397406
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss2/6
1989] NOTE 407
B. Constitutional Challenges
Medical malpractice statutes of repose have been challenged on var-
ious state and federal constitutional grounds prior to and following the
perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's. Earlier
cases uniformly held that the statutes did not violate various state or
federal constitutional provisions. 4 3 In later cases, medical malpractice
statutes of repose have continued to survive federal constitutional at-
tacks, but an emerging segment of state courts has begun to find the
statutes violative of various state constitutional provisions. 4 4
1. Federal Constitutional Challenges
Medical malpractice statutes of repose have often been challenged
as violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 5 None of these
challenges has succeeded, however, due to the Supreme Court's rigid
and deferential approach to reviewing legislation asserted to be violative
of the equal protection or due process clauses. 4 6 This approach consists
of three standards of judicial review: (1) strict scrutiny, 47 (2) rational
reason for the separate and unequal treatment that it imposes on medical mal-
practice litigants." Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93 (R.I. 1983).
43. For a discussion of early state court decisions upholding the constitu-
tionality of medical malpractice statutes of repose, see infra notes 67-85 and ac-
companying text.
44. For a discussion of state court decisions finding medical malpractice
statutes of repose unconstitutional under various state constitutional provisions,
see infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982) (as-
serted that Minnesota statute violated federal equal protection and due process);
Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Tenn. 1978) (asserted that stat-
ute violated federal equal protection).
46. One court may have held that a medical malpractice statute of repose
violated federal equal protection. In Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 56, 316
S.E.2d 155, 156 (1984), and Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 471, 298 S.E.2d 484,
485 (1983), Georgia's medical malpractice statute of repose was challenged as
violating state and federal equal protection. In both cases the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the statute violated equal protection but did not specify whether
its holding was based on state or federal constitutional grounds or both. Shessel,
253 Ga. at 59, 316 S.E.2d at 158; Clark, 250 Ga. at 472, 298 S.E.2d at 486.
For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's equal protection and due
process standards of review and their effect on medical malpractice reform legis-
lation, see Turkington, supra note 36, at 1308-17 and infra notes 47-49 and ac-
companying text. For a general discussion of constitutional challenges to
statutes of repose, see Note, supra note 11, at 635-48.
47. The strict scrutiny analysis subjects the legislation to the highest level
of judicial review. See Turkington, supra note 36, at 1313-14. For this level of
scrutiny to be applied, a fundamental right, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel), or a suspect class, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race), must be affected
by the legislation. See Turkington, supra note 36, at 1315. If a fundamental right
or suspect class is affected, the legislation is presumed to be unconstitutional
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basis 48 and (3) intermediate scrutiny.49 Since medical malpractice stat-
utes of repose do not affect a suspect class 50 or a fundamental right 5 '
under the United States Constitution, and do not affect classes based on
illegitimacy or gender, courts have applied the lowest level of judicial
review, the rational basis test, when passing on the constitutionality of
these statutes. 52  Unless the party challenging the legislation can
demonstrate that the law is not rationally related to furthering a legiti-
mate state interest, courts will generally exercise great deference to leg-
and the state must demonstrate that the legislation is necessary to further a com-
pelling state interest. Id. at 1314.
48. The rational basis test subjects the legislation to the least demanding
level ofjudicial scrutiny. Turkington, supra note 36, at 1310-13; see also Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (Court will not overturn statute not burdening
suspect class or fundamental interest unless legislative actions were irrational).
This level of review is normally applied to economic and social welfare legisla-
tion not affecting a suspect class or a fundamental right. See Turkington, supra
note 36, at 1308-13. Under this analysis there is a strong presumption that the
legislation is constitutional. Vance, 440 U.S. at 97. To overcome this presump-
tion the party challenging the legislation must demonstrate that the legislation is
not "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest." Id. (quoting
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)). More-
over, the Court will not consider the empirical success or failure of the legisla-
tion under this standard of review in determining whether or not a rational basis
existed. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64
(1981) (states are not required to convince courts of correctness of their legisla-
tive judgments in light of empirical evidence regarding effectiveness of legisla-
tion). Consequently, this level of review in effect immunizes the legislation from
any type of judicial action. See Turkington, supra note 36, at 1310-13.
49. The intermediate scrutiny standard falls somewhere between strict
scrutiny and the rational basis test. The Supreme Court has limited the use of
this level of scrutiny to legislation distinguishing on the basis of illegitimacy or
gender. Turkington, supra note 36, at 1315. When this level of review is ap-
plied, the legislation is again presumed to be unconstitutional and the state must
demonstrate that the legislation substantially furthers a significant state interest.
Id. at 1314. Although the intermediate level of scrutiny is less rigorous than the
strict scrutiny standard, a court's utilization of the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard still makes it more likely than not that the legislation will be found uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 1314-15.
50. The Supreme Court has viewed a class as "suspect" when legislation
establishes classifications based on alienage, nationality or race, or when legisla-
tion affects "discrete and insular minorities." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971). For a discussion of the standard used to evaluate legislation
affecting suspect classes, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82-84
(1978) (implying right to recover damages in tort not fundamental right). For a
discussion of fundamental rights and the strict scrutiny standard, see supra note
47 and accompanying text.
52. See Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984)
("[r]ational basis is the proper test, because the statute of repose does not in-
fringe a fundamental right nor does it involve a suspect classification"); Jewson
v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982) (statute of repose held consti-
tutional since statute's provisions were not irrational with respect to its legiti-
mate purpose); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1978)
(medical malpractice statute of repose evaluated under rational basis standard).
408 [Vol. 34: p. 397
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islative determinations and uphold the legislation when reviewing it
under the rational basis test. 53 Consequently, legislation is rarely found
unconstitutional when scrutinized under this standard of review. There-
fore, since state legislators could have rationally believed that medical
malpractice statutes of repose further the legitimate state interest of
providing adequate and affordable health care to the public, state and
federal courts have uniformly held that medical malpractice statutes of
repose do not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. 5 4
Although some commentators feel the Supreme Court could take a
more activist posture in reviewing economic and social welfare legisla-
tion in the future, 55 others disagree.5 6 Consequently, it appears uncer-
tain whether the Court's deference to legislative determinations in this
area will continue. However, as long as the rational basis test is the stan-
dard of judicial review for medical malpractice statutes of repose chal-
lenged under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, it is unlikely that the statutes will be found viola-
tive of the United States Constitution.
2. State Constitutional Challenges
While challenges to medical malpractice statutes of repose under
the federal constitution have been unsuccessful, challenges under vari-
ous state constitutional provisions have enjoyed greater success in sev-
eral states. These challenges have asserted that the statutes are violative
of state equal protection 5 7 or due process58 constitutional guarantees,
53. For a discussion of the rational basis test, see supra note 48 and accom-
panying text.
54. For a discussion of cases addressing the constitutionality of medical
malpractice statutes of repose, see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
55. One commentator believes that while a present majority of the Court
will not engage in a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny concerning economic or
social welfare legislation, there is a sufficient number of members on the Court
who, ifjoined by several new members, would create a majority that would en-
gage in such a level of review. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 535-37 (3d ed. 1986). Whether the Court would extend
this level ofjudicial scrutiny to medical malpractice legislation is uncertain.
56. Professor Turkington asserts that the Supreme Court's attitude toward
tort-reform-type legislation will not change in the foreseeable future. Turk-
ington, supra note 36, at 1316. He asserts that even the members of the Court
who take a more expansive view of the Court's role in reviewing state legislation
would be reluctant to engage in a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny in review-
ing tort reform legislation. Id. This is because these Justices believe "the
Court's role in protecting individual rights and in preventing injustice ought to
be primarily focused on noneconomic fundamental rights such as privacy,
speech or association, or on legislation unfairly directed at groups such as racial
minorities, or women .... " Id.
57. Medical malpractice statutes of repose have been challenged as violat-
ing equal protection on the basis that they create various arbitrary and unrea-
sonable classifications. Classifications asserted by various plaintiffs include:
plaintiffs who discover their injuries within the repose period and those who do
1989] NOTE 409
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or "open courts" or "right-to-a-remedy" provisions also contained in
many state constitutions. 5 9
State courts have generally followed the Supreme Court's three-
tiered approach when reviewing legislation challenged on state due pro-
cess or equal protection grounds. 60 But since states may grant their citi-
zens greater rights than those granted by the federal constitution, 6 1
some state courts have recently been more willing to engage in a height-
not, Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982) (Minnesota law,
constitutional); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 58, 514
N.E.2d 709, 714 (unconstitutional); medical malpractice plaintiffs and all other
tort plaintiffs, Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 312 (La. 1986) (Lemmon, J.,
concurring) (constitutional); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 823 (Okla. 1988)
(special statute limiting scope of recoverable damages unconstitutional); medical
malpractice claimants without benefit of discovery rule and all other malpractice
claimants, Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (1984) (un-
constitutional); plaintiffs with a foreign object negligently left in their body and
all other medical malpractice plaintiffs, Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 332 (8th
Cir. 1983) (Iowa law, constitutional); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 48 (Colo.
1984) (unconstitutional); Ross v. Kansas City Gen. Hosp. & Medical Center, 608
S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo. 1980) (constitutional); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,
936, 424 A.2d 825, 833 (1980) (unconstitutional); and health care practitioners
and other tortfeasors, Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 318-19, 402 N.E.2d
560, 571 (1979) (statute which distinguished between physicians and hospitals,
and all other health care providers found constitutional); Stephens v. Snyder
Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 127, 631 P.2d 222, 233 (1981) (constitutional);
Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 183, 646 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Ct. App. 1981), cert.
quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982)
(constitutional); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Tenn. 1978)
(constitutional); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah
1981) (constitutional).
58. See, e.g., Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 308-09 (La. 1986) (consti-
tutional); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 59, 514 N.E.2d
709, 715 (1987) (unconstitutional).
59. See Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77, 80 (Del. 1979) (constitu-
tional); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1987)
(unconstitutional), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988). The Ohio Constitution's
right-to-a-remedy provision is typical of those contained in other state constitu-
tions. It provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his land, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay."
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16. There is no such analogous provision in the United
States Constitution. See Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo.
1986).
60. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 78-79, 688 P.2d 961, 970 (1984)
(there are three tests available to determine constitutionality of statute under
equal protection analysis); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn.
1978) (strict scrutiny was inappropriate since statute did not interfere with fun-
damental right and all other classifications have generally been subjected to ra-
tional basis test). But see Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 310 (La. 1986)
(federal multilevel system is not appropriate model under Louisiana
Constitution).
61. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983) (states can grant
greater rights than those conferred by federal constitution) (citing Prune Yard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).
410
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ened level of judicial review when passing on the constitutionality of
medical malpractice statutes of repose. 62 Consequently, several courts
have found that medical malpractice statutes of repose do not suffi-
ciently further the legitimate state interest of providing affordable health
care to the general public and are therefore unconstitutional. 63
Several state courts have also found medical malpractice statutes of
repose violative of states' open courts or right-to-a-remedy constitu-
tional. provisions. Under these provisions, statutes of repose have been
found to deny a plaintiff access to the courts for a remediable wrong,6 4
deny him his remedy without providing a suitable substitute 6 5 and make
a remedy contingent on an impossible condition. 66 Consequently, an
increasing number of recent state court decisions have held that medical
malpractice statutes of repose are violative of open courts or right-to-a-
remedy provisions.
3. Early Decisions
Prior to 1980, medical malpractice statutes of repose were uni-
formly upheld against numerous state and federal constitutional chal-
lenges.6 7 Several of these decisions concerned statutes enacted by a
legislature in response to judicial adoption of the discovery rule or
before the state had adopted the discovery rule, rather than in response
to the perceived medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's.68
The legislative purpose of these earlier statutes was generally held to be
62. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (1984)
(abolition of discovery rule valid only if it serves compelling state interest); Car-
son v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980) (rights affected
by medical malpractice statute of repose and other reform legislation are suffi-
ciently important to require more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under
rational basis test); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 824-25 (Okla. 1988) (stat-
ute not reasonably and substantially related to high cost of medical malpractice
insurance).
63. For examples of courts holding that medical malpractice statutes of re-
pose do not further legitimate state interests, see cases cited supra note 62.
64. See Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 46, 512 N.E.2d 626, 627-28
(1987) ("Appellant has no remedy for an injury to his body when his claim is
extinguished before he knew of injury or could have reasonably discovered it.").
65. See Sax v. Votteller, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-67 (Tex. 1983) (since statute
abolished minor's right to bring well established common-law cause of action
without providing reasonable alternative, it violated open courts provision).
66. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1984) (legislature has no
power to make remedy contingent on impossible condition).
67. For a list of pre-1980 cases upholding the constitutionality of such stat-
utes and of post-1980 cases finding such statutes unconstitutional, see supra
notes 4-5.
68. See, e.g., Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 26, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545-46
(1976) (statute enacted before adoption of discovery rule); Holmes v. Iwasa, 104
Idaho 179, 181-82, 657 P.2d 476, 478-79 (1983) (statute enacted in response to
judicial adoption of discovery rule).
19891 NOTE
15
Trombetta: The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the preclusion of stale claims. 69 These earlier cases scrutinized the stat-
utes under an assumption that the statutes were a legislative modifica-
tion of a rule of common law70 or a legislative determination as to what
was a reasonable period of limitations for commencing a cause of
action. 7 i
In Owen v. Wilson, 7 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Arkan-
sas' medical malpractice statute of repose did not violate due process.
73
The court treated the statute of repose as if it were a typical statute of
limitations and held that a court "may not strike down a statute of limita-
tions unless the period before the bar becomes effective is so short that
it amounts to a virtual denial of the right itself or it can be said that the
legislature has committed palpable error."'74 The court held that this
limitations period, which could potentially bar a plaintiff's claim before
he discovered it, was reasonable. 75 The court further noted that statutes
of limitations are practical devices necessary to spare the courts from
litigating stale claims. 76 Arkansas had not yet adopted the discovery
rule when Owen was decided. 77 The court concluded its opinion by
holding that the plaintiff's arguments might be more appropriately ad-
dressed to the legislature. 78 The Owen decision effectively held that
adoption of the discovery rule was not constitutionally compelled.
Medical malpractice statutes like the one in Owen, containing ex-
press statutory language that the claimant's cause of action accrued on
the date of the negligent act, were relatively rare prior to the medical
malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's. 79 However, many similarly
69. For a further discussion of the purpose of these statutes, see infra note
124 and accompanying text.
70. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 703, 501 A.2d 27, 34 (1985) (since
there is no vested right in rule of common law, discovery rule may be modified
by statute).
71. See Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 24-25, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1976)
(court may not invalidate limitations period unless it is unreasonable); Laughlin
v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968) (statute of limitations is not un-
constitutional unless time allowed for commencement of action and date fixed
when statute commences to run are clearly and plainly unreasonable).
72. 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976). The statute provided that an ac-
tion for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years of when the
action accrued. Id. at 23-24, 537 S.W.2d at 544 (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-
205 (1962)). The statute expressly stated that a cause of action against a physi-
cian accrued on the date of the wrongful act complained of. Id. at 24, 537
S.W.2d at 544. In Owen, the plaintiff did not discover that the defendant physi-
cian had negligently left a surgical instrument inside him until six years after the
surgery was performed. Id. at 23, 537 S.W.2d at 544.
73. Id. at 24-26, 537 S.W.2d at 545-46.
74. Id. at 25, 537 S.W.2d at 545.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 26, 537 S.W.2d at 545-46.
77. See id at 24, 537 S.W.2d at 544,
78. Id. at 26, 537 S.W.2d at 545-46.
79. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 305, 402 N.E.2d 560, 564
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worded statutes were enacted in response to the crisis. When these sim-
ilarly worded statutes were originally challenged, Owen and other similar
cases were fairly representative of the existing case law concerning the
constitutionality of medical malpractice statutes of repose. 80 Therefore,
up until 1983, Owen and the other similar cases 81 were frequently fol-
lowed by state courts upholding the constitutionality of medical mal-
practice statutes of repose. 82 These opinions typically demonstrated
great deference to determinations made by state legislatures. 8 3
Courts had generally followed the rationale of the Owen decision
when addressing the constitutionality of medical malpractice statutes of
repose. 8 4 In the early 1980's, however, several courts began to utilize a
state equivalent of the rational basis test when passing on the constitu-
tionality of medical malpractice statues of repose enacted in response to
the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's. 8 5 Initially, this
(1979) (prior to medical malpractice insurance crisis, few states had special limi-
tations statutes for medical malpractice cases). Other statutes, while not ex-
pressly stating that the cause of action accrued on the date of the negligent act,
provided for the same time of accrual by not adopting the discovery rule. For a
general discussion of the development of statutes of repose and the discovery
rule, see supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
80. In Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held
that Delaware's medical malpractice statute of repose was not violative of the
Delaware Constitution's open courts provision. 401 A.2d 77, 80-81 (Del. 1979).
This statute was enacted in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis
of the 1970's. Id. at 79. The court, citing Owen and some similarly decided cases
as being representative of the general law concerning medical malpractice stat-
utes of repose, held that Delaware's statute was constitutional. Id. at 80-81; ac-
cord Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 311-12, 402 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1979)
(citing similarly decided cases, noted all cases researched sustained the validity
of medical malpractice statutes of repose); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 703 &
n.4, 501 A.2d 27, 34 & n.4 (1985) (citing Owen and later similarly decided cases,
held that great majority ofjurisdictions had upheld medical malpractice statutes
of repose).
81. In Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 54-55, 546 P.2d 26, 31
(1976), and Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968), the courts
held that the repose periods in two respective medical malpractice statutes of
repose were reasonable. As such, both decisions were frequently cited in later
cases which upheld the constitutionality of such statutes.
82. For a discussion of cases finding medical malpractice statutes of repose
constitutional, see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
83. See Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 26, 537 S.W.2d 543, 546 (1976) (issue
would be more appropriately addressed to general assembly as policy matter).
84. The reasoning of Owen has been relied upon to sustain the constitution-
ality of medical malpractice statutes of repose when challenged under open
courts provisions, see Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77, 80-81 (Del. 1979),
and equal protection or due process provisions, see Stephens v. Snyder Clinic
Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 131-32, 631 P.2d 222, 235 (1981) (equal protection); An-
derson v. Wagner, 79 Il1. 2d 295, 311-12, 402 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1979) (due pro-
cess). The rational basis test has also been used to sustain a medical malpractice
statute of repose challenged under an open courts provision. See Hill v. Fitzger-
ald, 304 Md. 689, 703, 501 A.2d 27, 34 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Il1. 2d 295, 315-17, 402 N.E.2d 560,
569-70 (1979) ("In the cases now before us there clearly is a sound and rational
17
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group of courts applying the rational basis test uniformly held that the
statutes were constitutional, with the result that the statutes were sus-
tained under the reasonable limitations period rationale of Owen and
under state equivalents of the Supreme Court's due process and equal
protection analysis.
4. Carson v. Maurer
In 1980, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Carson v. Maurer8 6
became the first state high court to find a medical malpractice statute of
repose unconstitutional. 8 7 In Carson, the plaintiff asserted that New
Hampshire's medical malpractice statute of repose 88 violated the equal
protection provision of the New Hampshire Constitution. 8 9 In deter-
mining that the statute of repose violated the claimant's equal protec-
tion rights, the court applied a level ofjudicial scrutiny similar to that of
the United States Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny test. 90 While
concluding that the right to recover for injuries to one's person is not a
fundamental right, the court held that it is an "important substantive
right" that is therefore worthy of a higher standard of judicial review. 9 1
The court further concluded that the legislature may not abolish the dis-
covery rule with respect to any one class of medical malpractice plaintiffs
and found the statute unconstitutional. 92 The Carson decision was im-
portant to the future of medical malpractice statutes of repose not only
because it was the first case in which a court held such a statute unconsti-
tutional but because it was also the first to apply an intermediate level of
judicial review to a medical malpractice statute of repose. 9 3
basis for the classification at issue."); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822,
824-25 (Tenn. 1978) (rational basis test appropriate standard of review).
86. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
87. Id. at 937, 424 A.2d at 834.
88. The plaintiff also asserted that other elements of New Hampshire's
medical malpractice reform statute were unconstitutional. Id. at 930, 424 A.2d
at 829-30 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C (Supp. 1979)).
89. Id. at 930-31, 424 A.2d at 830. The statute in question in Carson was
actually enacted as a statute of limitations with a limited application of the dis-
covery rule. The statute provided an absolute two-year period of repose com-
mencing from the date of the negligent act for all medical malpractice claimants
except for claimants who discovered that a foreign object had been negligently
left within their bodies. Id. at 935, 424 A.2d at 833. This latter class of claim-
ants had two years from the date of discovering the object to commence their
action. Id.
90. Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830-31.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 936, 424 A.2d at 833.
93. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Carson was also one of the first
state courts to apply a heightened level of judicial scrutiny to medical malprac-
tice reform legislation generally. See Turkington, supra note 36, at 1328-29.
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5. Later Decisions
Following Carson, the majority of jurisdictions considering the con-
stitutionality of medical malpractice statutes of repose continued to find
them constitutional. 9 4 It was not until 1983 that this trend shifted to
where an increasing number of courts began to find medical malpractice
statutes of repose violative of various state constitutional provisions. 95
This trend appears to have coincided with growing judicial sentiment
that the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's was illusory
and that the legislation enacted in response to it was inappropriate. 96
This sentiment induced an increasing number of state courts to engage
in a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny, resulting in decisions that med-
ical malpractice statutes of repose violated equal protection, due pro-
cess 9 7  or respective states' open courts or right-to-a-remedy
provisions. 98 The opinions sound in fairness and the protection of indi-
vidual rights.99
In Kenyon v. Hammer,1 ° the Arizona Supreme Court held, based on
specific provisions of the Arizona Constitution, that the right to bring an
94. For a list of cases holding such statutes constitutional, see supra note 4.
For a graphic depiction of the the leading post-1980 cases still holding medical
malpractice statutes of repose constitutional after Carson, see chart, supra note 5.
95. For a list of post-1983 cases holding medical malpractice statutes of
repose unconstitutional, see supra note 4. For a graphic depiction of the trend of
leading post-1983 decisions finding such statutes unconstitutional, see chart,
supra note 5.
96. Some of the earlier courts to address the constitutionality of medical
malpractice statutes of repose considered the medical malpractice crisis legiti-
mate. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 301, 402 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1979)
("It is generally agreed that in the early 1970's what has been termed a medical
malpractice insurance crisis existed in most jurisdictions in this country."); Har-
rison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tenn. 1978) ("[T]his state and the na-
tion were in the throes of what was properly described as a 'medical malpractice
insurance crisis.' "). However, an increasing number of later courts began to
refer to the crisis as "perceived." See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 72, 688
P.2d 961, 964 (1984) (perceived malpractice crisis); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32
Ohio St. 3d 45, 48, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1987) (perceived crisis in area of mal-
practice insurance), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
97. See Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 87, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (1984) (vio-
lated state equal protection); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 52 (Colo. 1984) (vio-
lated state equal protection); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 944, 424 A.2d
825, 838 (1980) (violated state equal protection); Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland,
Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 59, 514 N.E.2d 709, 715 (1987) (violated state due
process).
98. See Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629
(1987) (violated state constitution's right-to-a-remedy provision), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1029 (1988); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1984) (violated
open courts provision of state constitution).
99. See Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 60, 514
N.E.2d 709, 716 (1987) (medical malpractice statutes of repose are simply un-
fair). For a related discussion, see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
100. 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984).
1989] NOTE 415
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action to recover damages for bodily injury was a fundamental right. 10 1
Consequently, it applied a level ofjudicial scrutiny similar to that of the
Supreme Court's strict-scrutiny analysis. 10 2 The court then found Ari-
zona's medical malpractice statute of repose violative of equal protec-
tion since the statute was not necessary to promote the state's interest in
ensuring that affordable health care was available to the general pub-
lic. 10 3 In determining that the purpose of the statute must be to provide
affordable quality health care to the general public instead of merely to
lower the cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums,10 4 the court
expressed a dissatisfaction, shared by several courts, with medical mal-
practice statutes of repose and general medical malpractice reform legis-
lation enacted in response to the "perceived" medical malpractice
insurance crisis of the 1970's.
[W]e believe that the state has neither a compelling nor legiti-
mate interest in providing economic relief to one segment of
society by depriving those who have been wronged of access to,
and remedy by, the judicial system. If such a hypothesis were
once approved, any profession, business or industry experienc-
ing difficulty could be made the beneficiary of special legisla-
tion designed to ameliorate its economic adversity by limiting
access to the courts by those whom they have damaged. Under
such a system, our constitutional guarantees would be gradu-
ally eroded, until this state became no more than a playground
for the privileged and influential. 10 5
This language clearly indicates that the court was unwilling to up-
hold this statute if its only effect would be to reduce medical malpractice
liability insurance premiums. Without evidence that these statutes have
any noticeable effect on the availability or affordability of health care,
medical malpractice statutes of repose become increasingly vulnerable
101. Id. at 83, 688 P.2d at 975. The court interpreted three provisions of
the Arizona Constitution to mean that the right to bring an action to recover
damages for bodily injury was a fundamental right in Arizona. Id. at 79-83, 688
P.2d at 971-75. First, the open courts provision prohibited abrogation of "the
right of action to recover damages" and further provided that "the amount re-
covered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." Id. at 79, 688 P.2d at
971 (citing ARIz. CONST. art. 18, § 6). Second, the Arizona equal protection
clause provides: "No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citi-
zens ... privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens .... See id. at 77, 688 P.2d at 969 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art.
2, § 13). Third, the constitution provides that "no law shall be enacted in this
state limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or
injury of any person." Id. at 79, 688 P.2d at 971 (citing ARIz. CONST. art. 2,
§ 31).
102. Id. at 83, 688 P.2d at 975.
103. Id. at 87, 688 P.2d at 979.
104. Id. at 84, 688 P.2d at 976.
105. Id.
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to judicial invalidation.' 0 6 With more and more courts beginning to
share the sentiment expressed by the Kenyon court, an increasing
number of medical malpractice statutes of repose have been found to be
unconstitutional. 10 7 Moreover, several courts having already upheld
medical malpractice statutes of repose under one constitutional chal-
lenge have found them unconstitutional under different circum-
stances 10 8 or have indicated in language of later related opinions that
the statutes may be found unconstitutional on different grounds.' 0 9
106. The Kenyon court required a causal connection between the statute of
repose and the affordability and availability of health care. However, one com-
mentator has also noted that inadequate demonstration that medical malpractice
reform legislation is causally connected to medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums and the "lack of evenhandedness in distributing the burdens of cost con-
tainment" present obstacles to the survivability of this legislation. Turkington,
supra note 36, at 1330.
107. For a list of decisions holding medical malpractice statutes of repose
unconstitutional, see supra note 4. For a graphic depiction of the trend of recent
decisions holding such statutes unconstitutional, see chart, supra note 5.
108. In Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-71 (1976) was originally upheld
when challenged as arbitrarily classifying plaintiffs on the basis of those who
discover a foreign object within their bodies and those who do not. Allrid v.
Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 38, 285 S.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1982). Subsequently, this
statute was found to be unconstitutional when challenged as distinguishing be-
tween plaintiffs who discover their injuries within the statutory period and those
who do not. Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 57-59, 316 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1984).
109. In Farley v. Engelken, the Supreme Court of Kansas, for the first time,
applied a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny to medical malpractice reform leg-
islation that was enacted in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis
of the 1970's. 241 Kan. 663, 672-73, 740 P.2d 1058, 1064-65 (1987). While this
case dealt specifically with legislation abrogating the collateral source rule, the
court noted that it had previously applied the rational basis test in upholding the
constitutionality of Kansas' medical malpractice statute of repose. Id. at 674,
740 P.2d at 1065 (citing Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d
222 (1981)). However, the court went on to hold that this previous decision did
not consider whether a heightened standard of review was appropriate. Id.
These dicta imply that the court may be willing to apply a heightened standard
of judicial scrutiny to Kansas' medical malpractice statute of repose in the fu-
ture, and possibly find it unconstitutional as it did the legislation abrogating the
collateral source rule.
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., the Supreme Court of Utah held that
Utah's products liability statute of repose violated the open courts provision of
the Utah Constitution. 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985). The court noted that it
had previously upheld the constitutionality of Utah's medical malpractice statute
of repose against equal protection and due process challenges, but that the stat-
ute had not been challenged under the open courts provision. Id. at 683 (citing
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981)). The court went
on to hold that there had been no showing in the earlier case that the medical
malpractice statute would not achieve its legislative purpose. Id. Consequently,
an open courts challenge to Utah's medical malpractice statute of repose sup-
ported with proper empirical data could be successful.
In Treat v. Kreutzer, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that it was aware of
the "very respectable authority" holding that certain medical malpractice stat-
utes of repose were violative of equal protection. 290 Ark. 532, 536, 720 S.W.2d
716, 718 (1986). The Arkansas Supreme Court went on to hold that since this
issue was not before the court it would be left for future consideration. Id. at
21
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Consequently, courts that have already decided the issue may be willing
to rethink their positions and strike down the statutes in the context of
future challenges.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Future of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose
The future of medical malpractice statutes of repose depends pri-
marily upon judicial willingness to protect individual rights by overrid-
ing legislative determinations. With a growing feeling that the medical
malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's was in fact "perceived," that
these statutes have little effect on the availability of affordable health
care and with tort law's marked shift in favor of plaintiff's rights during
recent years, it appears likely that an increasing number of medical mal-
practice statutes of repose will be found unconstitutional.
1. 1987 Ohio State Court Decisions
The Ohio Supreme Court found Ohio's medical malpractice statute
of repose violative of the Ohio Constitution's right-to-a-remedy provi-
sion" l1 in Hardy."I The court then found the statute violative of the
536, 720 S.W.2d at 719. This may imply that the Arkansas Supreme Court is
willing to find Arkansas' medical malpractice statute of repose unconstitutional
and therefore distinguish or overrule Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d
543 (1976).
In Theriault v. A.H. Robbins Co., a dissenting justice indicated that while
Idaho's medical malpractice statute of repose had been held not to violate equal
protection or due process, it did appear to violate the Idaho Constitution's open
courts provision. 108 Idaho 303, 309-11, 698 P.2d 365, 371-73 (1985) (Bistline,
J., dissenting). Justice Bistline and another justice also suggested that the stat-
ute could be found violative of equal protection if challenged on this ground in
the future. Id. at 309-15, 698 P.2d at 371-77 (BistlineJ., dissenting, and Hunt-
ley, J., concurring). The statute has yet to be challenged under the open courts
provision. Id. at 309-11, 698 P.2d at 371-73.
In Young v. Haines, the Supreme Court of California implied that Califor-
nia's medical malpractice statute of repose, at least as it applies to minors, would
not survive an equal protection challenge. 41 Cal. 3d 883, 900-01, 718 P.2d
909, 919, 226 Cal. Rptr. 547, 557 (1986). The goal of this statute was to provide
insurers with greater certainty about their liability. Id. at 900, 718 P.2d at 919,
226 Cal. Rptr. at 557. The court held:
This court is not presented with the question whether a restricted
statute of limitations with narrow tolling provisions for all malpractice
plaintiffs is rationally related to this goal. However, it is difficult to see
how discrimination against minor malpractice plaintiffs vis-a-vis adults
is rationally related to this or any other ascertainable legislative goal.
The fact that such discrimination against minors would bar some meri-
torious claims and thereby reduce total malpractice liability is not
enough to justify it. If claims are reduced in an arbitrary manner, the
classification scheme denies equal protection of the law.
Id. at 900-01, 718 P.2d at 919, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 557. The court then decided the
case on nonconstitutional grounds. Id. at 901-02, 718 P.2d at 919, 226 Cal.
Rptr. at 557.
110. OHIo CONST. art. I, § 16.
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equal protection' 12 and due process' 13 provisions in Gaines.' 14 Ohio's
medical malpractice statute of repose provides that medical malpractice
actions must be commenced within four years following the act or omis-
sion constituting the alleged malpractice." 15
In Hardy, the plaintiff discovered an injury to his ear allegedly
caused by surgery negligently performed by the defendant physician ten
years earlier.' 16 The court held that the statute violated the right-to-a-
remedy provision of the Ohio Constitution because a plaintiff discover-
ing his injury after the statutory period had elapsed was not permitted a
reasonable time within which to commence his action.1 17
In Gaines, the plaintiff had undergone surgery in 1980 to have an
intrauterine device ("IUD") removed.' 18 In 1983, approximately three
and one-half years following the surgery, the plaintiff discovered that the
IUD was still inside her, and that it had perforated her uterus and had
become embedded in her left ligament. 1 9 In 1985, more than four
years from the date of the surgery, the plaintiff filed suit against the al-
legedly negligent surgeon who had performed the surgery.12 0 Although
the plaintiff had discovered her injury within the four year repose pe-
riod, she still had less than one year to commence her action. 12 1 The
court held that the statute was violative of equal protection because dis-
tinguishing between medical malpractice claimants "who discover their
(injuries] in time to enjoy a full year to organize a legal action, and those
who do not, does not rationally further the goal of alleviating the alleged
111. Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626, 627-28
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
112. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
113. Id. § 16.
114. Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 54, 59, 514 N.E.2d
709, 715 (1987) (court also again found statute violative of right-to-remedy
provision).
115. Hardy, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 512 N.E.2d at 627 (citing OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Anderson 1982)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 47, 512 N.E.2d at 628. The court further held: "When the Con-
stitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it re-
quires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." Id.
118. Gaines, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 54, 514 N.E.2d at 711.
119. Id.
120. Id. Before plaintiff could file suit she was also required to provide 180
day notice of her intent to sue. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (B)
(1982)). Consequently, since she underwent surgery on April 30, 1980, discov-
ered the injury on October 18, 1983 and was required to provide 180-day notice
of her intent to sue, she had approximately 15 days from the discovery of the
injury to forward her notice and preserve her claim which would have been
barred if she had not filed her claim within four years of the surgery. Id.
121. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court had previously held that allowing a med-
ical malpractice claimant one year from the discovery of his injury to commence
a suit was a reasonable time. Adams v. Sherk, 4 Ohio St. 3d 37, 39, 446 N.E.2d
165, 167-68 (1983).
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medical malpractice crisis in this state." 122 The Gaines court also found
the statute violative of due process. 123 The Hardy and Gaines opinions
demonstrate a marked shift in judicial reasoning concerning these
statutes.
2. The Significance of Hardy
The court's holding in Hardy is significant not only because it
reached a contrary conclusion to that of the Owen court using similar
reasoning, but because the Hardy holding is more consonant with the
purpose and logic of the discovery rule. Owen and its progeny applied a
reasoning that is inconsistent with the discovery rule by treating statutes
of limitations that could bar a plaintiff's claim before he discovered it as
reasonable. Many of these cases held that the purpose of statutes of
limitations is to "spare the courts from litigation of stale claims and the
citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, wit-
nesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost."' 124 More
appropriately though, statutes of limitations are designed to promote
justice and prevent stale claims by "preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared," and
by requiring a plaintiff to put his "adversary on notice" of the plaintiff's
just claim. 125 Obviously, as the Gaines court noted, a claim cannot be
allowed to slumber unless one realizes that a claim exists. 12 6 In addi-
tion, one cannot have ajust claim before he has any claim. 12 7
The courts in Owen and its progeny may have been reluctant to
strike down medical malpractice statutes of repose because the discov-
122. Gaines, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 514 N.E.2d at 714.
123. Id. at 59, 514 N.E.2d at 715.
124. Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark. 21, 26, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545-46 (1976)
(quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (citing Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
125. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944); see Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 472, 298 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1983)
("A claim which has not arisen has not been slumbering and is not stale.").
While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of any
statute of repose, it has adopted the discovery rule for medical malpractice
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118-25 (1979), and under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1982), see Urie v. Thompson,
337 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1949).
126. See Gaines, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 514 N.E.2d at 715. ("The fact that
[plaintiff] did not discover his claim until after three years had passed does not
necessarily indicate that he 'slept on his rights' since in many cases he will be
unaware that he had any rights.").
127. One justice stated that "[ilt is axiomatic that a statute of limitations
does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action ex-
ists." Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 54 (Colo. 1984) (Dubofsky, J., concurring)
(quoting Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952)
(Frank, J., dissenting)).
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ery rule was, at that time, a relatively new and significant modification of
established tort law.12 8 Permitting limited use of the discovery rule may
have seemed reasonable when earlier cases were decided because plain-
tiffs' rights were enlarged while the established doctrine was not totally
abrogated.' 29 This reasoning is consistent with many courts' and legis-
latures' original limitation of the discovery rule to particular circum-
stances.130 With the growing acceptance of the discovery rule in
medical malpractice actions, 13 1 these original inhibitions may have de-
creased to the point where courts may now be willing to apply the dis-
covery rule more freely. Consequently, future courts considering the
reasonableness of a limitations period that can bar a plaintiff's claim
before he is or should be aware that one exists may be more willing to
follow the holding of Hardy rather than Owen.
3. The Significance of Gaines
Gaines is significant because it is one of the first state court decisions
to invalidate a medical malpractice statute of repose using a state
equivalent of the rational basis test.' 3 2 This court went the furthest of
any court to date in overriding the will of a state legislature in the area of
medical malpractice statutes of repose. The Gaines court went so far as
to say that even if the statute actually achieved its purpose of reducing
the cost of health care, it would still be unconstitutional since the means
of achieving this goal "are unreasonable and arbitrary."' 13 3 This court
128. For a discussion of the adoption of the discovery rule in medical mal-
practice actions, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
129. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 704-05, 501 A.2d 27, 35 (1985)
(since time period provided in Maryland's medical malpractice statute of repose
is longer than that provided by law existing at time open courts provision to
Maryland Constitution was adopted, no violation of that constitutional provision
was found); see also Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 955-56 (4th Cir.
1984) (purpose of North Carolina statute of repose was to enlarge, not to re-
strict, time within which action could be brought).
130. For a discussion of the limitation of the discovery rule to particular
situations, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the growing acceptance of the discovery rule, see
supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
132. Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St. 3d 45, 59, 514 N.E.2d
626, 715 (1987). The Colorado Supreme Court in Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41,
49-53 (Colo. 1984), also invalidated a medical malpractice statute of repose us-
ing the rational basis test. However, the Austin court followed the reasoning of
Carson which had applied the intermediate test ofjudicial scrutiny. Id. at 52 (cit-
ing Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980)). Consequently, the
Austin court's rational basis test may be more akin to the intermediate scrutiny
test. See also Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 58-59, 316 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1984)
(distinguishing between plaintiffs who discover their injuries before expiration
of repose period and those who do not is arbitrary).
133. Gaines, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 514 N.E.2d at 715. While this Note sug-
gests that courts finding medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitutional
are in fact overriding the will of state legislatures, at least one justice has as-
serted that this is not the case, and that these courts are merely determining if
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expressly stated what many other courts finding these statutes unconsti-
tutional have merely intimated: medical malpractice statutes of repose
are "simply unfair."1 34
While even the Gaines court indicated that unfairness alone is insuf-
ficient to find a statute violative of any constitutional provision, 3 5 un-
fairness will be the determinative factor in moving future courts to
protect the individual rights of medical malpractice claimants by finding
medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitutional. While other
limitations on medical malpractice actions may or may not be upheld,
courts may be more willing to find statutes of repose unconstitutional
since a plaintiff's entire claim may be barred before he is aware of his
injury. 13 6 The effect ofjudicial dissatisfaction with a limitation or abro-
gation of the discovery rule, combined with a similar dissatisfaction with
general medical malpractice legislation enacted in response to a per-
ceived medical malpractice insurance crisis, may be sufficient to move
future courts to find medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitu-
tional, while sustaining other less restrictive medical malpractice reform
legislation.
Although earlier courts may have been willing to uphold medical
malpractice statutes of repose when the medical malpractice insurance
crisis seemed real and threatening, present and future courts may find it
increasingly difficult to turn away injured plaintiffs when it appears that
this crisis was illusory or that the legislation enacted in response to it
was inappropriate. At least one commentator has noted that potential
medical malpractice claimants are not an influential group with the
power or organization to appeal to a legislature for protection of its
rights. 137 This group's only effective remedy may be through judicial
these statutes are consistent with constitutional guarantees. Mominee v.
Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 279 & n.8, 503 N.E.2d 717, 724 & n.8 (1986)
(Celebrezze, J., concurring).
134. Gaines, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 60, 514 N.E.2d at 716. In its opinion the
court also noted that the state had not offered evidence that Ohio's medical mal-
practice statute of repose had reduced medical malpractice insurance premiums
or the cost of health care. Id. at 59, 514 N.E.2d at 715.
135. Id. at 61, 514 N.E.2d at 716.
136. In Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 83, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (1984), the
court noted that it had upheld several other sections of Arizona's medical mal-
practice act including the use of medical screening panels, the admission of the
panel's findings into evidence and abolition of the collateral source rule. The
court held that these sections merely regulate "what is done with the action after
it is brought and prescribe the procedure to be followed before trial and the
admission of evidence at trial" and do not therefore "affect the essence of the
right to bring a lawsuit." Id.
137. See Learner, supra note 35, at 185. Learner asserts that medical mal-
practice victims should be treated as a "suspect" or "semi-suspect" class since
they, as potential victims, "possess no readily identifiable personal characteris-
tics that facilitate their political organization in opposition to legislation restrict-
ing malpractice recovery." Id. at 185-86. He also asserts that the right to bodily
freedom from uncompensated private assault should be a "quasi-fundamental
422 [Vol. 34: p. 397
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action. 1 38 Consequently, consistent with tort law's principal purpose of
compensating injured victims, 139 courts should be more willing to en-
gage in a heightened level ofjudicial review, such as the Carson and Ken-
yon courts did, or merely reject medical malpractice statutes of repose as
the Gaines court did.
4. Automobile Guest Statutes
In determining if ajudicial sense of fairness will be sufficient to find
medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitutional in the future, the
history of the automobile guest statute is illustrative. 140 In the 1920's
and 1930's many state judiciaries adopted a common law rule that a
driver was liable to any nonpaying passenger for any injury caused by
the driver's "ordinary" negligence. 14 1 In response to the adoption of
this rule, insurance lobbyists pressured various state legislatures to en-
act automobile guest statutes. 142 These statutes normally provided that
a driver was only liable for any injury caused to the nonpaying passenger
by the driver's gross negligence or willful or wanton conduct. 14 3 Ini-
right." Id. at 189-95. These "quasi" classifications could therefore justify a
heightened standard of review under the Supreme Court's three-tiered analysis
or the use of the quid pro quo concept proposed by Learner. Id. at 195-201; see
also Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 740 P.2d 1058, 1064 (1987) (opinion re-
lied on Learner's reasoning in justifying court's application of heightened level
of judicial scrutiny to medical malpractice reform legislation).
138. Concerning the constitutionality of a medical malpractice statute of
repose, one justice has commented: "Justice in this case cries out for a remedy.
How can anyone be precluded from asserting a claim by a statute of limitations
which expires before the discovery of the injury? How can anyone charged with
the responsibility of administering justice allow such an absurdity?" Mominee v.
Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270, 293, 503 N.E.2d 717, 735 (1986) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (emphasis supplied by the court) (quoting Amer v. Akron City
Hosp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 85, 93, 351 N.E.2d 479, 485 (1976) (Celebreeze, J.,
dissenting)).
139. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 5-6.
140. For a history of the development and downfall of automobile guest
statutes, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap
to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 99 [hereinafter Com-
ment, Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes]; Comment, The Common Law Basis
of Automobile Guest Statutes, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 798 (1976) [hereinafter Comment,
The Common Law Basis].
14 1. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes, supra note
140, at 99.
142. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 215 (automobile guest statutes
are generally acknowledged to have been the result of persistent and effective
lobbying by insurance companies). But see Comment, The Common Law Basis,
supra note 140, at 801-09 (asserting that origin was based in common law duties
of care); Comment, Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes, supra note 140, at
104 (origin unclear).
143. See Comment, The Common Law Basis, supra note 140, at 798 ("host
driver is only liable if his conduct involves 'gross negligence,' 'recklessness,'
'willfull misconduct,' intoxication, or some equivalent").
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tially, these statutes withstood repeated constitutional challenges.' 4 4 In
1973 however, the Supreme Court of California, in Brown v. Merlo,' 4 5
held that California's guest statute violated the equal protection clauses
of the United States and California Constitutions. 146 The court held
that the statute did not substantially further the state's interest in
preventing collusive lawsuits. 14 7 The opinion emphasized the manifest
unfairness of the guest statute to nonpaying passengers and alluded to
the pressure that the insurance lobbyists had applied to get the legisla-
tion enacted. 148 Soon thereafter, several courts followed the reasoning
of Merlo and struck down their states' guest statutes.1 49 Other states
which originally refused to follow Merlo continued to follow the tradi-
tional decisions and sustained the constitutionality of these statutes. 150
Eventually, however, many of these later courts reversed themselves and
struck down the statutes also. 1 5  This trend continued until nearly
every guest statute was found unconstitutional or repealed. 1
52
Similarly, many states adopted medical malpractice statutes of re-
pose in response to a modification of tort law-the adoption of the dis-
covery rule-or its alleged effect on the medical malpractice insurance
crisis of the 1970's.' 53 This legislation, at least the portion enacted in
response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, was the result of
intense lobbying pressure by insurance and medical groups.' 5 4 Medical
malpractice statutes of repose, like automobile guest statutes, can totally
144. Id. at 799 (during first wave of constitutional attacks that occurred
soon after statutes were enacted, statutes were uniformly upheld).
145. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
146. Id. at 882, 506 P.2d at 231, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
147. Id. at 859, 506 P.2d at 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The court also held
that the statute did not promote the state's other questionable interest in pro-
moting hospitality. Id. at 864-72, 506 P.2d at 218-24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394-400.
148. Automobile guest statutes were the "result of persistent and effective
lobbying on the part of insurance companies." Id. at 873, 506 P.2d at 225, 106
Cal. Rptr. at 401 (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 187 (4th ed.
1971)). "[T]he widespread antipathy to [guest] statutes is in large part a reflec-
tion of the irrationality and unfairness of these [statutes], which strip the single
class of automobile guests of any protection from negligently inflicted injuries."
Id. at 883, 506 P.2d at 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
149. See Comment, The Common Law Basis, supra note 140, at 799 & n.8 (by
1975 eight other courts found their guest statutes unconstitutional).
150. Id. at 799-800 & n.8 (by 1975, 10 other courts upheld their guest stat-
utes after reconsideration in light of Merlo).
151. See, e.g., Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 585 (Iowa 1980) (find-
ing Iowa's automobile guest statute violative of equal protection, overruling
Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974)).
152. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 663 (Utah 1984) (indicating that
almost every state which has enacted automobile guest statute has subsequently
found it unconstitutional, repealed it or significantly modified it).
153. For a discussion of the enactment of medical malpractice statutes of
repose in response to adoption of the discovery rule and the medical malpractice
insurance crisis of the 1970's, see supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the insurance industry's effect on the enactment of
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bar certain injured victims' claims. Medical malpractice statutes of re-
pose enacted in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis,
and earlier statutes enacted in response to the adoption of the discovery
rule, initially withstood various constitutional challenges. 15 5 Many of
the opinions holding medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitu-
tional allude to the manifest unfairness that such statutes produce.' 56
Many of these opinions have also alluded to the invalidity of the medical
malpractice insurance crisis or the ineffectiveness of the statutes. 15 7
While no state court has yet overruled itself, language in several cases
indicates that courts will be willing to find these statutes unconstitu-
tional in the future.' 58 In addition, at least one court which has found a
medical malpractice statute of repose unconstitutional has cited a deci-
sion striking down an automobile guest statute for support.' 59 Conse-
quently, the similarity between the development and downfall of
automobile guest statutes and the history of medical malpractice statutes
of repose may indicate that future courts will be willing to protect indi-
vidual rights and find medical malpractice statutes of repose
unconstitutional.
Another factor that may influence future courts to find medical mal-
practice statutes of repose unconstitutional is the number of cases hold-
ing these statutes constitutional or unconstitutional. The law in the area
of medical malpractice statutes of repose appears to be quite sensitive to
trends.' 60 Several of the decisions addressing the constitutionality of
medical malpractice statutes of repose indicated that they were influ-
medical malpractice statutes of repose, see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying
text.
155. For a discussion of such constitutional challenges, see supra notes 43-
85 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the unfairness of medical malpractice statutes of
repose, see supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the differing viewpoints concerning the legitimacy
of the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970's, see supra notes 38-42
and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of cases implying a willingness to overrule such stat-
utes in the future, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626,
628 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988) (citing Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio
St. 2d 195, 205, 331 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1975)). One state court justice has ex-
pressed the difficulty in distinguishing between upholding medical malpractice
reform legislation generally and automobile guest statutes. See Bierkamp v.
Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 586 (Iowa 1980) (LeGrand,J., dissenting) ("[T]he leg-
islative desire to protect the health-care practitioner directly and society indi-
rectly from high insurance premiums in the one case is the same as the
legislative desire to protect the host motorist directly and the motoring public
indirectly from high insurance premiums in the other."). But see Owen v. Wil-
son, 260 Ark. 21, 24-25, 537 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1976) (refused to find medical
malpractice statute of repose unconstitutional based on decision finding auto-
mobile guest statute unconstitutional).
160. See Note, supra note 11, at 653 (suggesting that opinions concerning
statutes of repose rely simplisticly on precedent).
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enced by the majority of courts finding these statutes constitutional. 16 1
Thus, if an increasing number of courts continue to find these statutes
unconstitutional, this may be sufficient to induce courts having already
decided the issue to reverse themselves or find the statutes unconstitu-
tional on other grounds. Similar influence appears to have occurred
during the downfall of the automobile guest statute. 162 Therefore, an
increasing number of medical malpractice statutes of repose may be
found to be unconstitutional due to the sensitivity of this area of the law
to trends.
Courts having already passed on the constitutionality of a medical
malpractice statute of repose should be able to avoid a problem with
stare decisis when the issue is reconsidered by them in the future.
Courts should be able to distinguish future cases in several ways. First,
the classification alleged to be created by the statute may be different
from any previously analyzed under an equal protection challenge. 163
Also, the statute may be challenged under a different provision of a
state's constitution.' 64 Finally, a court may be willing to consider evi-
dence concerning a statute's effectiveness in justifying the application of
a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. 16 5 Consequently, future courts
161. See, e.g., Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that
majority of states adopting discovery rule have enacted statutes of repose); Jew-
son v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 410 n.10 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that majority
of states adopting discovery rule have enacted statutes of repose); Dunn v. St.
Francis Hosp., 401 A.2d 77, 80-81 (Del. 1979) (reasoning of earlier cases up-
holding medical malpractice statutes of repose is representative of general law
and must govern); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 310-11, 402 N.E.2d 560,
567 (1979) (all cases uncovered by research sustained validity of medical mal-
practice statutes of repose); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 703 & n.4, 501 A.2d
27, 34 & n.4 (1985) (great majority ofjurisdictions considering medical malprac-
tice statutes of repose have upheld them); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 184,
646 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing four pre-1983 cases upholding
medical malpractice statutes of repose as support for its holding), cert. quashed,
98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
162. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 663, 675 (Utah 1984) (relying heav-
ily on overwhelming number of courts finding guest statutes unconstitutional).
163. For a discussion of the Georgia Supreme Court's determination that
Georgia's medical malpractice statute of repose violated equal protection under
one challenged classification after surviving a previous challenge under a differ-
ent classification, see supra note 108 and compare Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56,
57-59, 316 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) with Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 38,
285 S.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1982).
164. The Supreme Courts of Utah and Idaho have suggested that their
states' medical malpractice statutes of repose may violate constitutional provi-
sions under which the statutes have not yet been challenged. See Theriault v.
A.H. Robbins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 309-11, 698 P.2d 365, 371-73 (1985)
(BistlineJ., dissenting); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah
1985). For a discussion of these cases, see supra note 109.
165. The Supreme Court of Utah also suggested that a showing that Utah's
medical malpractice statute of repose does not substantially further its legislative
purpose may be sufficient to find the statute unconstitutional. See Berry v. Beech
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should have enough flexibility to avoid expressly overruling themselves
in finding these statutes unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
An increasing number of state courts should continue to find medi-
cal malpractice statutes of repose unconstitutional. The reasoning of
recent courts holding such statutes unconstitutional is logical, fair and
consistent with the purpose of tort law. Completely eliminating merito-
rious claims to reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums should
be unsettling to future courts, especially when it appears that the medi-
cal malpractice insurance crisis was perhaps more of an overreaction
than a crisis, and when increased premiums still comprise only a small
percentage of total health care costs.16 6 In light of these developments,
courts should be increasingly uncomfortable with placing the burden of
paying for a health care practitioner's negligence on the one least able
to pay and least responsible for the injury, the innocent victim. 16 7
Therefore, future state courts should be guided by their judicial con-
sciences and should continue to find medical malpractice statutes of re-
pose unconstitutional.
ChristopherJ. Trombetta
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985). For a discussion of this case, see
supra note 109.
166. It appears that medical malpractice insurance premiums account for
only a relatively minor proportion of health care costs and health care practi-
tioners' incomes. "Even after the rapid growth in premiums during the mid-
1970's, malpractice insurance costs seemed to be about one percent of total
health care spending since 1976." Mominee v. Scherbarth, 28 Ohio St. 3d 270,
280, 503 N.E.2d 717, 725 (1986) (CelebreezeJ., concurring) (quoting Bovbjerg,
Koller & Zuckerman, Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical Research on
Major Policy Issues, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986 at 85, 93). Despite the
continued increase in premium costs the ratio of these costs to the average
health care practitioner's income has remained nearly constant. Id. "The
AMA's [American Medical Association's] own surveys show that average pre-
mium costs as a percentage of physician's [sic] gross income were about 3.7% in
1983, down from 4.4% in 1976 and about the same as in 1979." Id. (quoting
Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986 at 5, 31).
167. See Turkington, supra note 36, at 1329-30.
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